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WHOSE NATURAL LAW?
WILLIAM J. KENEALY, S. J.*

P

ROFESSOR GEORGE

W.

GOBLE

of the Law Faculty of the University

of Illinois has written a challenging and significant article, entitled
"NATURE, MAN AND LAW: THE TRUE NATURAL LAW," in
the American Bar Association Journal of May, 1955. (Vol. 41, No. 5,
p. 403). Professor Goble's article is refreshingly free from the acerbities
which too often detract from the substance of controversial articles pro
and con the natural law. The article manifests the kindness and humility
of sincere scholarship. It follows a standard of calm and dispassionate
controversy which might well assist both proponents and opponents of
the classical natural law, if not to resolve their differences, at least to
discover them. Such a mutual discovery, in the opinion of this reviewer,
would be a major contribution to the most ancient controversy of the law.
Professor Goble's article is significant because it illustrates the fact
that the status quaestionis of the old controversy is badly out of joint. It
brings into focus the fact that contemporary proponents and opponents of
the classical natural law frequently argue about "two different things."
The issue is not joined. Professor Goble sets up and rejects a concept
of natural law which would also be repudiated by every classicist from
Thomas Aquinas to Heinrich Rommen. By "classicists" I mean the
scholars and spokesmen of the traditional natural law philosophy as
expounded by the medieval scholastics and the modern neo-scholastics.
The concept rejected by Professor Goble differs essentially from the
classical concept in two fundamental and all-pervasive aspects: the very
meaning of the natural law, and its epistemological basis. Obviously the
issue cannot be joined and the merits cannot be argued on the basis of
such fundamental misunderstanding.
In discussing the meaning of the classical or traditional concept of
natural law, I trust that I will be forgiven for quoting an official statement
of the Law School of which I am dean. I do so for two reasons: first,
I wrote it some years ago in an attempt to set out a concise statement
of the classical concept; and secondly, it has appeared annually for some
years in the official Bulletin of a Law School dedicated to the traditional
natural law philosophy. To the best of my knowledge, it has not been the
target of a single shaft of disagreement from the ready quivers of tradi*A.B.; A.M.; Ph.D.; S.T.L.; LL.B. Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia
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tional natural law philosophers. The statement, with italics as they appear in the original text, is as follows:
"The purpose of the Boston College Law
School is to prepare
young men and
women of intelligence, industry and
character, for careers of public service in the administration of justice; to
equip them for positions of leadership
in advancing the
ideals of justice in
WM. J. KENEALY, S.J.
our democratic society. With this two-fold objective, students
are given a rigorous training in the principles
and rules, the standards and techniques of
the law, not as positivistic ends in themselves,
but as rational means, capable of constant
improvement, to the attainment of objective
justice in civil society.
"For the Boston College Law School is
dedicated to the philosophy that there is in
fact an objective moral order, to which
human beings and civil societies are bound
in conscience to conform, and upon which
the peace and happiness of personal, national and international life depend. The
mandatory aspect of the objective moral
order is called by philosophers the natural
law. In virtue of the natural law, fundamentally equal human beings are endowed
with certain natural rights and obligations
to enable them to attain, in human dignity,
the divine destiny decreed for them by their
Creator. These natural rights and obligations are inalienable precisely because they
are God-given. They are antecedent, both in
logic and in nature, to the formation of civil
societies. They are not granted by the bene-

LAWYER

ficence of the state; wherefore the tyranny
of a state cannot destroy them. Rather it is
the high moral responsibility of civil society,
through the instrumentality of its civil laws,
to acknowledge their existence and to protect their exercise, to foster and facilitate
their enjoyment by the wise and scientific
implementation of the natural law with a
practical and consonant code of civil rights
and obligations.
"The construction and maintenance of a
corpus juris adequately implementing the
natural law is a monumental and perpetual
task demanding the constant devotion of
the best brains and the most mature scholarship of the legal profession. For the fundamental principles of the natural law, universal and immutable as the human nature
from which they derive, require rational
application to the constantly changing political, economic and social conditions of
civil society. The application of the natural
law postulates change as the circumstances
of human existence change. It repudiates
a naive and smug complacency in the status
quo. It demands a reasoned acceptance of
the good, and a rejection of the bad, in all
that is new. It commands a critical search
for the better. It requires an exhaustive
scrutiny of all the available data of history,
politics, economics, sociology, psychology,
philosophy, and every other pertinent font of
human knowledge. Of primary importance,
it insists that the search for a better corpus
juris be made in the light of the origin, nature, dignity and destiny of man; and in the
knowledge of the origin, nature, purpose
and limitations of the state.
"This is the traditional American philosophy of law, the philosophy upon which this
nation was founded and to which this nation, by its most solemn covenants and usages, is dedicated. It is opposed today, even
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by some within the legal profession, by the
philosophies of positivism, pragmatism,
realism and utilitarianism - all of which
have an ideological common denominator
in subjectivism- and none of which can
offer an intellectually adequate reply to the
destructive philosophy of totalitarianism."
Cf. Boston College Bulletin, Vol. XXVII,
No. 2, April, 1955.
I believe that this capsule description of
natural law philosophy is in complete harmony, not only with the classical concept
of Maritain, Gilson, Rommen and the modern neo-scholastics, but also with that of
Aquinas, Suarez, Vittoria and the medieval
scholastics. Hundreds of professors, teaching the classical concept in universities
today, would undoubtedly write a better
description; but I am confident that none
would dispute the substance of the statement quoted. If this is so, if the statement
fairly represents the meaning of the classical
natural law concept, with particular reference to its notion of immutability and universality, its distinction between ends and
means, its requirement of change and improvement, and its search for the good and
the better, then I find it difficult to escape
the conclusion that Professor Goble has
not come to grips with that concept. I think
that he is chastising the wrong horse.
Professor Goble seems to contemplate
the classical concept as meaning a completely closed system of principles and rules,
immutable and universal, incapable of
change and improvement, and therefore a
hindrance to the pursuit of truth and an
obstacle to the development of a better system of justice. He states:
Holmes, unlike the natural law man, did
not believe that because he firmly held certain views, they were necessarily universal
or infallible truths, or that the acceptance of

them by others was essential to the preservation of civilization or the republic. . . . The
classical natural law on the other hand, by
definition, must forever remain unchanged.
While experience has required its devotees
to recede from this position from time to
time, by hypothesis the system is immutable.
No amount of experience or new light may
be used as the basis for altering it or revising it. It seems to me therefore, that the
Holmes' view makes possible the continuous
advance of the standards of human conduct,
whereas the natural law view, having in
theory already attained perfection, retards
it. (p. 474, emphasis supplied).
I trust that the above quotations do not
distort Professor Goble's context. That context misses the meaning of the classical
natural law of the scholastic tradition. In
fairness to Professor Goble, his context has
considerable relevance to the "natural law"
theories of Pufendorf, Thomasius, Hobbes,
Spinoza and their followers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This was
the era of the various "state of nature" theories which fascinated the autonomous rationalism of the times. The "state of nature"
theories inspired an orgy of abstract reasoning which gave birth to deductively constructed systems purporting to regulate and
to crystallize all legal institutions down to
incredible details: prescribing the rules affecting contracts, debts, the acquisition and
use of property, inheritance, the family,
constitutional and international law - and
even procedural laws in the alleged "states
of nature." Such theories were frequently
utilized for rather practical purposes: sometimes to strengthen the contemporary political, economic and social status quo by dignifying it with the blessing of "natural law";
sometimes to undermine the prevailing
status quo by damning it with the condemnation of "natural law." But all such "state
of nature" theories, with their closed and
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crystallized legal systems, were and are alien
and hostile to the classical concept of natural
law. Their authors are the express adversaries of the scholastic system. I need not
point out that the theological phrase status
purae naturae has only a verbal similarity
to the philosophical "states of nature" of
rationalism.
It is quite true, of course, that the classical natural law postulates some fundamental
principles, which are considered immediately self-evident principles of the practical
reason, as certain, universal and immutable.
But this is a far cry from a closed legal system. The fundamental principles of the
natural law are generally divided into a
primary principle and its immediate specifications, called secondary principles. The
primary principle is usually phrased in such
terms as "What is good is to be done, and
what is evil is to be avoided," a principle
which includes "What is just is to be done,
and what is unjust is to be avoided." As
immediate specifications of the primary
principle, the secondary principles find
familiar expression in the (still general)
terms of the Decalogue. The secondary
principles share the certainty, universality
and immutability of the primary principle.
But when we advance from these fundamental principles, we enter the field of
derivative principles and standards and applications of the natural law to concrete
problems.
The derivatives do not share equally,
some do not share at all in the certainty,
universality and immutability of the fundamental principles. They do not bask in the
sunshine of immediate self-evidence. They
must be laboriously cultivated in the much
dimmer light, sometimes in the darker twilight, of mediate evidence. In the field of
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derivatives there is certainty, probability
and mere possibility; there is growth, change
and improvement. Incidentally, even the
truths called "self-evident" in the Declaration of Independence are not self-evident in
the philosophical sense. They are derivative
principles of natural law. They must be
demonstrated by argument. It is only the
fundamental principles of the natural law
which are held to be self-evident, and consequently certain, universal and immutable.
From this position devotees of classical natural law have not receded "from time to
time." It is a fair question to ask: what
fundamental principle, what principle held
to be certain, universal and immutable has
been relinquished at any time by devotees
of the classical natural law?
That natural law does not mean a closed
legal system, is evident from the fact that
the fundamental principles do not tell us
automatically in concrete applications what
is good or evil, just or unjust, wise or unwise;
what is idolatry, murder, theft, adultery,
perjury or calumny. It is evident from the
fact that the natural law envisions an enormous number of actions which are indifferent in themselves, and which receive their
morality (and suitable legality) from the
relative elements of time, place and circumstance, and from the subjective elements of
intention and motive. It is evident from the
fact that the natural law concept requires
the construction, maintenance and improvement of a corpus juris to meet the needs of
a constantly changing human society; and
that it demands that this perpetual task be
performed by the scholarly and practical
use of the expanding data of human knowledge and experience. This is utterly incompatible with Professor Goble's idea of the
"attained perfection" of the classical natural
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law concept. The possession of a compass
does not make the navigator's job unnecessary.
Professor Goble objects to the traditional
natural law concept because he believes it
has been used to further objectionable causes
and to obstruct desirable social and economic reforms. He states:
Exponents of classical natural law are
usually able to find or create natural law
principles which support what they want to
believe .... Before the Civil War both proslavery and anti-slavery advocates invoked
natural law as the basis for their views....
During the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries the opposition to legislation prohibiting child labor, reducing working hours
for women, and improving working conditions in hazardous industries, was based
partly upon the principle that by natural law,
freedom of contract could not be interfered
with by legislation. (p. 473)
The first quoted sentence pinpoints an
unfortunate psychological weakness which
afflicts all men when they are blinded by
emotions, prejudices and the smoke of selfish interests. Natural law exponents can
claim no immunity from the weakness
which, I dare say, sometimes leads positivists, pragmatists, realists and utilitarians
"to find or create" respective principles
"which support what they want to believe."
All of us need to overcome this weakness
by an intensification of scholarly criticism
and dispassionate controversy. The chief
examples cited by Professor Goble are, to
say the least, weak indictments of the classical natural law. The nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries spanned the era of
laissez-faire rugged individualism, which
stemmed from the philosophies of Rousseau,
Kant, Austin and the Manchester School of
Economics. It is true that the Supreme Court
of the era utilized the terminology of "nat-

ural law" to deify an abstract concept of
liberty of contract for the protection of
vested property interests to the detriment
of human rights. But the philosophers mentioned above, and the proponents of laissezfaire rugged individualism are again the
express adversaries of the classical natural
law philosophy. Again, it is fair to ask what
representative natural law philosopher or
spokesman held the principle that "by natural law, freedom of contract could not be
interfered with by legislation"? A philosophy is one thing, its terminology is another;
but its terminology in the mouths of its
express adversaries is a great source of confusion, misunderstanding and embarrassment. Economic Liberalism itself recognized the classical natural law philosophy
as its prime adversary.
Professor Goble's criticism of classical
natural law, on the basis of its alleged "attained perfection" and immutability, seems
analogous to the criticism of those who
reject natural law philosophy because it defends absolute natural rights. Natural law
does indeed imply the existence of some
human rights which are absolute and inalienable, such as the right to life, worship, marriage, property, labor, speech, locomotion,
assembly, reputation, etc. These are absolute
in the sense that they derive from human
nature; they are not mere hand-outs from
the state; the state is bound to protect them
and cannot destroy them even though, by
physical force, the state has sometimes prevented their exercise. They are not absolute
in the sense that they are unlimited in scope.
It is a commonplace in classical natural law
philosophy that human rights, even the most
fundamental mentioned above, are limited.
They are limited in the sense that they are
subject to specification, qualification, expan-
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sion and contraction, and even forfeiture of
exercise, as the equal rights of others and
the demands of the common good from circumstance to circumstance, and from time
to time, reasonably indicate. Human rights
are absolute only in the sense of the minimal
requirements of a just and ordered liberty.
But this is not the stuff of a closed system
of immutably "attained perfection." This is
the stuff which requires the constant study,
scholarship, experience and experimentation
implied in the quotation I have made from
the Boston College Law School Bulletin.
For the above reasons I believe Professor
Goble has misunderstood the meaning of
the classical natural law philosophy.
Of equal significance, I believe, is Professor Goble's misunderstanding of the
epistemological basis of natural law. This
basis answers to the question of why natural
law men hold what they hold. Professor
Goble says:
Since reason is fallible, the principal
problem posed by this view of natural law
[quoted, by the way, from Dean Pound] is
how or by whose reasoning is this infallible
law to be determined. When two or more
men or groups of men of equal sincerity
believe themselves to be endowed by the
Creator with the power to ascertain and
enunciate it, and they are in disagreement,
by what criterion is the choice to be made
between them? . . . History furnishes so

many examples of fighting faiths later rejected as unconscionable that it is difficult

pro-slavery and anti-slavery advocates invoked natural law as the basis for their
views. (p. 473.)
Mr. Justice Holmes has been one of the
great critics of the classical natural law
theory. He said, "The jurists who believe in
natural law seem to me to be in that naive
state of mind, that accepts what has been
familiar, and accepted by them and their
neighbors, as something that must be accepted by all men everywhere." Holmes believed that "Certitude is not the test of
certainty," and that "we have been cock-sure
of many things that were not so." (pp. 473474. Emphasis supplied.)
I have supplied the italics in the above
quotations. From these quotations and their
context, and I trust they do not distort the
context, I infer that Professor Goble believes that the epistemological basis of natural law philosophy is: the criterion of
truth is subjective certitude or sincerity of
subjective conviction. This is simply not
true. It is diametrically opposed to the epistemology of classical natural law. It is fair
to ask for the name of one responsible
natural law spokesman who makes subjective conviction the criterion of truth. On the
contrary, natural law philosophers unanimously set up objective evidence as the
criterion of truth. The philosophers of various theories of subjectivism, Descartes,
Spinoza, Leibnitz, Berkeley, Hume, and
their followers are again the express episte-

for one to believe that sincerity or certitude

mological adversaries of classical natural
law.

is a reliable test of truth. (p. 407. Emphasis
supplied.)
Witness the comparatively recent condemnation of millions of innocent people to
death in gas chambers, to imprisonment in
slave labor camps and to banishment in the
salt mines because of the certitude of their
condemners as to their own racial superiority or the infallibility of their political sys-

The natural law is founded upon the
existence of an objective moral order and
the knowability of objective truth. Quite
consistently, and necessarily, it makes objective evidence the criterion of that truth.
To argue for or against natural law, or any
one of its principles, or any application of

. Before the Civil War both

its principles, on the basis of mere subjec-

tems. .

.
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tive certitude or sincerity of conviction,
would be as irrelevant and immaterial as
any similar argument in any intellectual
field - philosophical, scientific or legal.
Subjectivism is sheer intellectual defeatism.
According to Professor Goble "the principal problem posed" by the natural law,
when "two or more men or groups of men
of equal sincerity" are in disagreement, is
this: "by what criterion is the choice to be
made between them?" The natural law philosopher answers: objective evidence. And
to the question as to who shall make the
choice, the answer is: whoever undertakes
to evaluate the objective evidence. This is
the epistemological basis for the civil law
rules of evidence. This is the standard underlying our legal trials. This is the standard
applied by our supreme courts in the difficult due process cases, which touch natural
law principles most closely. To abandon
objective evidence for a subjective standard would be to open the flood-gates of
arbitrariness and capriciousness. Subjectivism is simply incompatible with natural
law philosophy.
In criticising natural law, Professor Goble
cites Holmes to the effect that "Certitude
is not the test of certainty" and that "we
have been cock-sure of many things that
were not so." With this observation of
Holmes, I agree. My agreement rests upon
the objective evidence of my own personal
errors and the objective evidence of the
history of human thought. Furthermore, my
agreement extends to the epistemological
principle which seems to be implicit in the
words of Holmes: namely, that there is a
rational basis for making a distinction between "certitude" and "certainty"; that
there is an intellectual difference between
error and truth; and that at least some cocksure errors of the past have been overhauled

by the relentless pursuit of objective truth.
To me this means that there are in fact
some objective truths known with certainty
on the basis of objective evidence. And if
there are some so known, what limits shall
we put to the critical and dispassionate pursuit of others? But this is the epistemology
of classical natural law.
Professor Goble places great emphasis
upon errors of the past, and upon the contradictions and disagreements of the past
and present - particularly those concerning
political, economic, social and legal problems. As an argument specifically against
natural law, this proves altogether too much.
Its probative value, if any, militates against
any and all philosophies. Positivists, pragmatists, realists and utilitarians differ considerably as to what in the concrete is positivistic, pragmatic, realistic and useful. But
such differences surely do not constitute the
intellectual basis for rejecting the philosophies of positivism, pragmatism, realism or
utilitarianism. Natural law philosophers
agree on the fundamental principles of the
natural law; they differ on its derivative
principles and standards; and there is wide
divergence of opinion as to the concrete
applications of its derivative principles and
standards to the constantly changing political, economic, social and legal conditions
of human society. But what do such differences of opinion prove? Surely not the invalidity of the fundamental philosophy. Such
differences demonstrate that the area of
opinion is larger than the area of certainty.
Such differences prove the finiteness of the
human mind and the enormous complexity
of the human problems which we must constantly strive to solve as best we can. Our
differences should indeed humble us and
make us more tolerant of the opinions of
others; but they should not defeat us or
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discourage the relentless pursuit of objective truth. Because they do not prove the
incapacity of the human mind to know with
certainty (i.e., without prudent fear of
error) some objective truths on the basis
of objective evidence. As a matter of fact,
"when two or more men or groups of men
of equal sincerity" differ, they may both
be wrong; but the significant thing is that
their very differing is predicated upon the
assumption that there is some objective
truth to differ about, and that the pursuit
of objective truth is worth-while. Error is
simply unintelligible without the existence
of objective truth attainable by human reason.
It is obvious, I trust, that this commentary on Professor Goble's article is in no
sense an attempt to prove the validity of
natural law or the soundness of its epistemology. It is simply an attempt to show
that Professor Goble has misunderstood the
meaning and the epistemology of the classical natural law philosophy. It is my personal
opinion that there are three factors which
have induced such a misunderstanding on
the part of Professor Goble and many others
in the legal profession. They are: first, the
misuse of natural law terminology, in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in
support of laissez-faire rugged individualism; second, the almost complete unfamiliarity of most members of the profession
with the writings of the great natural law
philosophers, and a consequent reliance
upon secondary (and sometimes unscholarly) sources of information; and third,
an unfortunate propensity, on the part of
some natural law enthusiasts, to claim too
much for their philosophy.
Concerning the first factor: many United
States Supreme Court opinions of the last
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century, indicated by Professor Goble,
which exalted property and contractual
rights to the detriment of other basic human
rights and the genuine needs of the common
good, are excellent examples. Regarding the
second: the writings of Holmes and the article by Professor Goble are, I believe, clear
instances. As to the third: I have reference
to the naive mentality which would say "all
we have to do to solve our problems is to
apply the natural law." This mentality has
its counterpart, of course, in that which
would say "all we have to do to solve our
problems is to be realistic" or "pragmatic."
It is quite like the simplicist attitude of the
naive citizen who would say "all we have
to do to solve our problems is to apply the
Constitution." The fact is that the classical
natural law philosophy teaches, as one of its
prime tenets, that the natural law and its
fundamental principles are inadequate to
solve the complex problems of human society. The natural law demands implementation by civil law; and such implementation
frequently involves, not merely research and
argumentation, certitude and probability,
but also trial and error experimentation. But
this is not the natural law dismissed by
Professor Goble.
Wherefore I have entitled this commentary "WHOSE NATURAL LAW?" Whose
natural law does Professor Goble dismiss?
Not mine. Not that of the Boston College
Law School. Not that of the medieval scholastics. Not that of the modern neo-scholastics. Not that of the classical tradition.
Whose? I confess that I look forward to the
opportunity to sit down informally with
Professor Goble some day to discuss, and
if possible to clarify, for our mutual satisfaction, the status quaestionis of the oldest
controversy of the law.

